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INTRODUCTION 
In their Supplemental Brief of the Appellants, the Harveys concentrate on one 
central argument - that the 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute should not be 
applied retroactively. While making this argument, the Harveys overlook the fact that the 
District Court did not apply the 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute retroactively. 
[R. 1111.] The District Court detemiined that there was "no material difference on the 
dispositive point of law" between the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection 
Statute. [Id.] Under either version, a disconnection petition creating an unincorporated 
island would be disallowed. [Id.] The text of the 2001 Disconnection Statute and the text 
of the 2003 Disconnection statute both forbid any disconnection that would create an 
island. 
In their Supplemental Brief, the Harveys also attack the annexation they requested 
which moved their property from unincorporated Utah County into the municipality of 
Cedar Hills. Potential defects in the annexation were not relevant to the District Court's 
order and are irrelevant on appeal. 
RESPONSE TO HARVEYS' STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Harveys assert in their Supplemental Brief that they are simply trying "to 
provide the court with some factual background." Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 8. 
However, the factual background provided by the Harveys is irrelevant and unhelpful in 
assisting this Court with its consideration of the District Court's June 3, 2008 Order, 
which the Harveys have specifically appealed. In particular, the Harveys identified what 
they characterize as "relevant" facts regarding the annexation of their property into Cedar 
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Hills. Several of the facts presented by the Harveys concerning the annexation of their 
property are not entirely accurate, but also such alleged facts are irrelevant and play no 
part in resolving the question before this Court—whether the District Court properly 
determined to grant summary judgment to Cedar Hills and deny the Harveys' 
disconnection petition. Indeed, before the District Court, the Harveys at one point agreed 
they "should not be permitted to present evidence of procedural defects in the 
annexation." [R 746, 753.] Arguments regarding the annexation of the Harveys' 
property into Cedar Hills did not play any role in the District Court's ruling on the 
Harvey's disconnection petition. In addition, the Harveys did not raise this argument as 
an issue on appeal.1 Therefore, the Harvey's cannot raise it now. See Gildeav. Guardian 
Title Co. of Utah, 2001 UT 75, flO n.l, 31 P.3d 543 (issues not raised in the opening 
brief are considered waived). 
The Harveys' Statement of Relevant facts also includes several paragraphs 
containing legal conclusions regarding the Harveys' ability to challenge the original 
annexation and to pursue their disconnection petition. Supplemental Brief of Appellants 
at 7. While Cedar Hills recognizes that the District Court issued a ruling on January 8, 
2006, addressing some of these legal questions [R. 655-60], Cedar Hills also notes that 
this ruling is not the subject of the Harveys' appeal. In its January 8, 2006 ruling, the 
1
 Concerning the issues raised on appeal, Cedar Hills noted in its Brief of Appellee that 
the Harveys had failed to identify the standard of review and citations to the record for 
each of their four identified issues on appeal. See Brief of Appellee at 2. The Harveys 
rectify this omission in their supplemental brief, but only identify three issues on appeal. 
See Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 2-3. It appears therefore, that the Harveys have 
waived the fourth issue on appeal originally contained in their Brief of Appellant. 
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District Court merely held that the Harveys were "free to pursue their disconnection 
petition." [R. 655.] Otherwise, Cedar Hills factual position remains as stated in its Brief 
of Appellee, pages 6 through 10. 
ARGUMENT 
In their supplemental brief, the Harveys assert that the 2003 Disconnection Statute 
should not be retroactively applied because doing so "will eliminate and destroy the 
Harveys' vested right to legally challenge the city's actions." Supplemental Brief of 
Appellants at 10. The Harveys' argument should fail, however, because (1) both the 
plain language of both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection Statute forbid the 
creation of islands, and (2) because the Harveys did not have an inviolate "vested right" 
pursue its disconnection petition. 
A. The District Court Held that Both the 2001 and 2003 Disconnection 
Statutes Prohibit the Creation of Islands. 
The Harveys argued against retroactive application of the 2003 Disconnection 
Statute in their original Brief of Appellants. See Brief%ofAppellants at 16-19. Cedar Hills 
hereby incorporates all of its arguments contained in its Brief of Appellee addressing all 
of the Harveys' arguments challenging the validity of the District Court's June 3, 2008 
Order, including the retroactivity argument. 
Nevertheless, to further address the Harveys' arguments against retroactive 
application of the 2003 version of the Disconnection Statue, Cedar Hills first notes that 
the Harveys do not dispute that their petition to disconnect would create an island of 
unincorporated property in Utah County completely surrounded by the cities of Cedar 
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Hills and Pleasant Grove. [R. at 1122: 19:11-14.] The 2003 Disconnection Statute 
clearly disallows a disconnection petition that would create an unincorporated island. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) (2003) (placing the burden of proof on the 
disconnection petitioners to show by a preponderance of evidence that the proposed 
disconnection will not create an unincorporated island or peninsula). As explained more 
fully below, the plain language of the 2001 Disconnection Statute also forbids islands. 
Under the both the 2001 and 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute, the District Court 
was required to dismiss the Harveys5 petition because they could not meet this burden of 
proof given the admission that the disconnection petition would create an unincorporated 
island. 
The plain language of the 2001 Disconnection Statute prohibits islands. The 
District Court was required to evaluate "whether or not islands or unreasonably large or 
varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of the 
municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." Id. at § 10-2-503(2)(i). If 
an island is created, this criteria, by itself, requires the dismissal of a disconnection 
petition, like the one filed by the Harveys. The dispositive nature of this criteria is 
manifest in the evaluation of "unreasonable" peninsulas. If a petition creates a peninsula 
that is unreasonable, it cannot be allowed because that would be unreasonable. To argue 
that this criteria is not dispositive suggests that "unreasonable" peninsulas are permitted 
by the 2001 Disconnection Statute. The far better reading of the 2001 Disconnection 
Statutes is that all "unreasonable" peninsulas are prohibited. And, all islands are 
forbidden the same as the most unreasonable of peninsulas. 
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Under the 2001 Disconnection Statute, the District Court must consider whether a 
"proposed disconnection satisfies all of the criteria in Section 10-2-503." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-2-506(4) (2001). The District Court must make its determination based upon 
the evidence presented at a hearing, and at the hearing, the burden of proof is on the 
petitioners to "prove the viability of the disconnection . . . by a preponderance of the 
evidence." Id. at § 10-2-506(3) (2001). At the heart of this dispute is the criteria in 
Section 10-2-503(2)(i) of "whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped 
peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of the municipality 
from which the territory is to be disconnected." Id. at § 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001). A 
disconnection petition that creates an island or unreasonable peninsula violates Section 
10-2-503. An unreasonable impact on one or more of the criteria in Section 10-2-503 
prohibits disconnection. Since the Harveys' disconnection petition would not satisfy one 
of the criteria of Section 10-2-503, the District Court could not grant the Harveys' 
petition under the 2001 Disconnection Statute. Thus, the District Court was required to 
deny the Harveys' petition, whether considered under the 2001 or the 2003 version of the 
Disconnection Statute, because it is undisputed that an island would have been created. 
The Order, signed by Judge Taylor on June 3, 2008, states that "the Court finds 
that there is no material difference on the dispositive point of law between the two 
versions of the statute at issue. Under either the 2001 or the 2003 version of the 
Disconnection statute, if a disconnection would result in an unincorporated island, the 
disconnection should be disallowed." [R. at 1111.] The Order says nothing about 
applying the 2003 Disconnection Statute retroactively. Instead, the District Court held 
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that applying either version of the Disconnection Statute would require the same result -
dismissal of the Harveys' disconnection petition. The Harveys' argument against 
retroactive application of the 2003 Disconnection Statute is therefore invalid unless this 
Court determines that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the 2001 and 2003 
Disconnection Statute and holds that the District Court should have solely applied the 
2003 Disconnection Statute to resolve the matter. 
Even if arguendo, this Court determines that the District Court applied the 2003 
Disconnection Statute retroactively, it should nevertheless uphold the District Court's 
ruling. Concerning retroactive application, Cedar Hills refers this Court to its argument 
in its Brief of Appellee at pages 24 to 27. Further, Utah courts have held that 
"[gjenerally, new procedural rules do not affect proceedings completed prior to 
enactment." State v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982). It is important to note that 
the Harveys acquiesced in the procedural requirements of the 2003 Disconnection 
Statute. [R. 811.] The 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute merely clarified that 
the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disconnection 
would not create an unincorporated island. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) 
(2003). Under the 2001 Disconnection Statute, one of the criteria for consideration was 
whether the disconnection created islands, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001), 
and the petitioner had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disconnection 
was viable, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-506(3) (2001). Both versions of the statute 
required the same consideration and placed the same burden of proof on the petitioners. 
As to the dispositive issue in this case, there was no substantive change. Where the 
4833-1330-2531.CE003.002 f. 
substance of the law has not changed, the general rule against retroactive application of a 
statute does not apply. Therefore, even if only the 2003 Disconnection Statute applied to 
the Harveys' disconnection petition, the District Court's decision should be upheld. 
B. The Harveys Do Not Have A Vested Right to Obtain Disconnection. 
The Harveys also assert that they had a vested right to bring a disconnection 
petition because the District Court held on January 5, 2007, that the Harveys were "free 
to continue to pursue their disconnection petition." [R. at 655.] The fact that the District 
Court ruled that the Harveys could pursue a disconnection petition does not mean that the 
Harveys had a vested right to obtain a disconnection. 
"The law in this state, as it is elsewhere, is that 'no one has a vested right in any 
rule of law' under either the open courts or the due process provisions of the Utah 
Constitution." Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp,, 111 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 
1985) (further citation omitted). It is true that "once a cause of action under a particular 
rule of law accrues to a person by virtue of an injury to his rights, that person's interest in 
the cause of action and the law which is the basis for a legal action becomes vested." Id. 
While a person may thus have the right to pursue a particular claim, the person does not 
necessarily obtain a vested right in a particular procedure. See Bd. of Equalization v. 
Utah State Tax Comin'n, 864 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1993). In addition, a person must 
establish that he or she is entitled to a remedy under that particular cause of action. 
In this case, the Harveys have not been deprived of the opportunity to bring their 
disconnection petition. As stated in the District Court's Memorandum Decision dated 
January 5, 2007, the Harveys were free to continue pursuing their disconnection petition. 
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[R. 655.] But, the Harveys did not have a vested right to a ruling in their favor because 
the law as applied to the facts did not justify granting their disconnection petition. The 
undisputed fact that their disconnection petition would create an unincorporated island 
deprived the Harveys of the ability to obtain approval of their disconnection petition. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001) and Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) 
(2003). 
By denying the Harveys' disconnection petition and granting summary judgment 
to Cedar Hills, the District Court did not deprive the Harveys of a vested right. The 
District Court merely determined that the Harveys, under both the 2001 and the 2003 
versions of the Disconnection Statute were not entitled to have their petition granted 
because granting the petition would create an unincorporated island in violation of the 
statute. 
The fact that the District Court was required to deny the Harveys' petition under 
the both the 2001 and the 2003 version of the Disconnection statute does not deny the 
Harveys of a vested right. Because the District Court's ruling did not affect any vested 
right that the Harveys may have had, this Court should affirm the ruling of the District 
Court below since summary judgment should be affirmed when the record shows "that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 (2008); Davis County Solid Waste 
Management v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60,1J9, 52 P.3d 1174. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the Harveys' contention, the District Court did not retroactively apply 
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the 2003 Disconnection Statute. Even if it had, the District Court's ruling should be 
affirmed because the 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute is not substantively 
different from the 2001 version for the dispositive issue in this case. Further, the District 
Court's actions did not deprive the Harveys of a vested right. In any event, because the 
plain language of both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection Statute prohibit 
the creation of unincorporated islands, the District Court correctly dismissed the Harveys' 
petition for disconnection and granted summary judgment to Cedar Hills. Therefore, 
Cedar Hills respectfully requests that the ruling of the District Court be AFFIRMED. 
DATED: May 27, 2009, 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Eric Todd Johnson 
R. Christopher Preston 
Kyle Fielding 
Attorneys for the City of Cedar Hills 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On May 27, 2009, two true and correct copies of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to each 
of the following: 
Gordon Duval 
Duval Haws and Moody, P.C. 
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